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ABSTRACT 
The transfer of technology from developed to underdeveloped 
economies is almost always associated with a conflict of interests 
between the supplier and the recipient of technology. Where this 
conflict arises control is exerted by the more powerful party to 
ensure that the conflict is settled in its favour. It is argued in 
this paper that control is allied to the power to determine the rate 
and type of accumulation of capital. A number of potential areas of 
conflict are discussed, and this is followed by a discussion of the 
mechanisms which the various parties can use to settle conflict in 
their favour. 
ACCUMULATION AND THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: 
ISSUES OF CONFLICT AND MECHANISMS FOR THE 
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IDS/DP 
INTRODUCTION 
Despite recent concern with distributional considerations, 
economic development requires the growth of production in under-
developed countries. The long run growth of this output results 
from the expansion of the capital"stock, a process which we will 
refer to as accumulation in "this paper,, While accumulation need 
not incorporate new techniques of production, the changing 
composition of output and the existence of new, more productive 
techniques generally ensures that accumulation in developed and 
underdeveloped economies alike incorporates new techniques of 
production. 
These new techniques result from the systematic application of 
science and technology to production. The overwhelming bulk of 
this activity, commonly referred to as research and development, 
takes place in the developed economies where it is increasingly 
concentrated in large firms involved in production and marketing 
in various parts of the world economy. These firms obtain 
proprietary rights over new techniques and are concerned to exploit 
this monopoly power to ensure that they maximise their share of the 
rewards which result from their use. This may involve the sole 
utilisation of these techniques or their sale to other producers, 
the precise strategy of course varying with particular circumstances. 
Underdeveloped countries may require these technologies if 
they are to maintain or increase their rate of economic growth. A 
variety of links have thus been established to enable the transfer 
of this technology from developed to underdeveloped economies. 
Any set of complex relationships between different 
individuals or groups of people is likely to lead to some misunder-
standing and conflict. But in the case of the transfer of technology, 
conflict does not result merely from misunderstanding others' motives 
and intentions - it is fundamentally built into the nature of the 
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transactions
1
. This is because the technology which is transferred 
is a primary input for the generation of surplus. Control over this 
technology is thus crucial, not only because it leads to control over 
the generation of this surplus, but also because it is an important 
element in the control of the distribution of the surplus. 
If it is true that conflict almost always arises in the 
transfer of technology, it is not always true that the conflict of 
interests is well articulated due to the varying degrees of 
development of the various classes involved. We are therefore faced 
with a variety of responses in the transfer of technology, ranging 
from complete perceived-harmony, through renegotiation of conflicting 
arrangements to the fundamental breakdown of the relationship between 
supplier and recipient. 
In this paper we shall be focussing on issues of potential 
conflict in the transfer of technology and mechanisms which are used 
to enforce the control of the dominant group. While we may be drawing 
evidence from a variety of case-studies, we do not intend that this 
broad survey should be applicable to any specific transaction. We 
shall not consider all the mechanisms of transfer, but only those which 
involve the ongoing - organised contact between supplier and recipient. 
Thus we" shall not" consider issues such as "the" outright arms-length 
purchases of technology, nor portfolio foreign investment, nor the 
utilisation of technical journals; but rather those involving direct 
foreign investment and contractual agreements (e.g. management, 
purchasing contracts). It is the continuing aspect of the relationship 
and the manner in which control is exercised which most interest us in 
this paper. 
1. This.view is not..held universally. Vernon.for example, argues 
in relation to conflict over export expansion that perceived conflict 
reflects a poor flow of information rather, than a .substantive conflict 
of interests. One view - a view of which I happen to be a partisan -
is that a more adequate flow of information, between.the less developed 
countries and the. advanced countries concerning market.demand and 
production capabilities would represent both the necessary and the 
sufficient condition for a considerable rise in exports on the part of 
the less developed countries. (46, p. 348) 
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In addition to narrowing our focus to a limited number of 
mechanisms of transfer, we shall also limit our discussion with regard 
to the institutional parties involved in the transfer of technology. 
It is our contention that there are three primary parties involved in 
conflict in the transfer of technology. These are:-
(1) The technology-supplier. In some cases, particularly in large 
ventures to extract raw materials, there may be two or more parties 
involved in the supply of technology. In these cases we do not propose 
to examine the conflicts which arise between the technology supplying 
parties, unless it enables a clearer understanding of conflict between 
the suppliers and recipients of the technology. 
(2) The host-partner. Here, too, there may be more than one partner 
but we do not propose to examine these intra-host-partner conflicts. In 
many cases, technology may be transferred through a wholly-owned 
subsidiary or a joint-venture with the host-state, and obviously there is 
no host-partner participation in this transaction. 
(3) The host-state. The host-state in underdeveloped countries is 
frequently involved in the purchase of foreign technology. Without 
suggesting that the host-state is a body representing a homogeneous set 
of class interests, we will give some consideration to its own influence 
and control over the transfer of technology. 
The choice of these three parties is not to deny that there may 
2 
be other important parties involved in the conflict but we believe that 
the empirical evidence supports our contention that there are three 
(and often only two) major partners involved in conflict over the 
transfer of technology. 
An attempt will be made in this paper to situate this conflict 
arising in the transfer of technology, by relating it to the common 
interest of the three parties in accumulation. By accumulation we 
mean the growth in physical capital. There are, of course, difficulties 
2. In particular, international agencies. We shall provide some 
discussion "o"f their role in the resolution of conflict. 
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which arise in this limited definition of accumulation,, For example, where 
investment is associated with negative value-added (which frequently occurs 
in import-substituting industrial strategies), the growth of physical 
capital in one sector of the economy may be associated with a net decrease 
in output. Nevertheless, in spite of such difficulties, this partial 
perspective on accumulation is necessary if we are to adequately explore 
the nature of conflict and the mechanisms available for its resolution.. 
One final introductory remark concerns our use of the term 
'technology'. We shall be using this term to discuss not only the physical 
technique of production which is used, but also the disembodied technological 
input. This is, of course, particularly relevant in discussing'management 
contracts, where'it is the ability to supply organisational inputs'and 
technological information which is the primary technology input which is 
being transferred. It is also relevant in the organisation of marketing 
outlets for the products of the enterprise. 
THE SETTING FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
The Extent of Conflict 
We shall be examining the interests of three parties in this section -
the technology-supplier, the 'national' industrial bourgeoisie and the 
'national' state apparatus. The latter two groups are not always well 
developed in many countries, but we shall be treating them as if they 
were so. The reason for this assumption is that we are exploring" the 
limits of national control here, and it is in this situation where these 
two national groups are 'well-formed' that national control is most likely 
to be exercised, if at all. 
There are a variety of specific interests which each party has 
in the transfer, and these will vary from transfer to transfer and 
country to country. However, there is one common interest which binds 
each of the three parties and that is the maximisation of the rate of 
accumulation. The firm supplying the technology is concerned to maximise 
its rate of accumulation at the global level, the host-state to maximise 
accumulation within the economy and the host-partner to maximise 
accumulation in relation to existing and potential rivals. Indeed it is 
these individual differences within the common desire to maximise 
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accumulation which is at the root of much of the conflict which arises 
in the transfer of technology. It is worth treating the objectives of 
each party in a little more detail. 
The Technology-Supplier: For many firms the optimal size of 
operations may not be a choice, and expansion may be essential if the 
firm is to survive. This tendency to grow may occur for a number of 
reasons. In the first place, the high fixed costs of investment 
associated with research-intensive technologies and product-
differentiating markets will require a high scale of output if unit 
costs of production are to be competitive. Secondly, these high 
investment costs will require the mobilisation of substantial sums 
of money to fund investment and it is easier for large- firms to mobilise 
these large sums. Thirdly, in the interest of risk aversion the firm 
will be tempted into diversification to avoid the risks of failure in 
any particular market. Finally, the firm may wish to integrate 
vertically in an attempt to carve for itself a monopoly position in 
the market or to ensure the availability of particular, scarce inputs. 
This tendency of expansion raises the question of what the firm 
is trying to maximise. Is it sales, or profits or accumulation? This 
is not an easy question to" answer as the three factors are generally 
complementary and not exclusive. Yet it is central to our argument 
that the firm aims to maximise accumulation. Insofar as sales are 
concerned, this may be an important objective of the firm. Yet sales 
can not be increased without productive capacity, unless the firm is 
prepared to establish itself as a merchant enterprise. So the ultimate 
concern of the firm must be to establish sufficient productive capacity 
through physical investment to enable the maximisation of sales, without 
at the same time possessing too great a productive capacity for the 
market. 
It is true that profits are necessary to enable this productive 
investment but care needs to be taken concerning the role of profits 
and accumulation by the firm. The distinction between distributed and 
reinvested profits needs to be kept in mind. The divorce of ownership 
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from control has meant that distributed profits must be seen as a constraint 
on accumulation by the firm, enabling management to satisfy shareholders and 
the firm to maintain its creditworthiness in the market0 Further, the surplus 
which is used to fund accumulation may never appear in the books as 'profit
1
, 
but may be 'hidden' in inventories or other compartments by transfer 
accounting practices« Thirdly, profits may not always be re-invested, or may 
be re-invested somewhere else and thus a high rate of profit may not be 
associated with a high rate of accumulation. Thus a surplus may be necessary 
if the firm is to continue to accumulate, but it should not be seen as an end 
in itself (as in the 'profit maximisation' principle) but rather as a means 
to enable continued accumulation by the firm. 
The Host-Partner; The host-partner also has strategic interests 
in maintaining or enlarging its own position with respect to domestic or 
foreign competition. It is indeed this very reason which forces it into a 
relationship with the technology-supplier. In some cases, the position and 
growth of the host-partner is closely related to its intimate links with the 
supplier of technology - one could refer to this type of firm as the 
'international' industrial bourgeoisie. At the other extreme the host-partner 
has a clearly articulated set of conflicting interests with the suppliers of 
technology - a position which could be referred to as that of 'national' 
industrial bourgeoisie. The particular aspect of this industrial class will 
3 
of course vary between underdeveloped countries. Although it is not often 
that a national industrial bourgeoisie is well developed, there are many 
underdeveloped countries (e.g. India) where it assumes quite significant 
proportionso Where both types of industrial bourgeoisie are in existence, 
they will almost certainly be in a different relationship (particularly 
with respect to the degree of articulated conflict) with the technology-
supplier. 
The Host-State: The state,' too, "has an "interest in accumulation. 
While a clear lack of interest occurs' in some c a s e s H a i t i is-a good example 
here), more generally in underdeveloped countries its"role has been"to 
attempt to increase the rate of accumulation, and in some cases to control 
3. . These industrial.classes should not fee seen as.twg distinct and., 
separate sets of actors. . The actual situation will inevitably, be more, 
ambiguous than has...'be_en..suggested._he.re and will vary from country to country 
and from situation to situation. We have been concerned here merely to 
sketch out two 'ideal types' of behaviour. 
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not merely its speed but also its nature. For the host-state, control 
over accumulation is not only necessary in relation to the rate of 
growth of the economy, but also because the state may desire to influence 
the composition of output. Control over the type of accumulation 
may thus assume considerable importance. Finally, the productive 
relations which exist will almost certainly affect the pattern of 
distribution,, The resulting pattern of distribution may be an 
important consideration in that it will affect the structure of demand 
and hence the type of accumulation
9
 it may itself affect the sort of 
physical capital which is chosen by the innovating class and, insofar as 
the saving propensities of classes differ, it will also affect the rate 
at which capital is accumulated. 
At the same time that we have noted a common objective shared 
by all three parties, we should be aware of significant differences 
which exist. The primary difference concerns the different spheres 
within which each of the parties is* concerned to maximise accumulation. 
The technology-supplier wishes to maximise accumulation-in-the" global 
economy. The host-state wishes to maximise accumulation .in..a particular 
economy (or region of the economy), as well as to influence the nature 
of the physical capital which is accumulated and the composition of 
output. Finally, the host-partner wishes to maximise accumulation in 
relation to its own rivals. This may, in some cases, lead it to 
choose a different rate of accumulation to the host-state and technology-
supplier in order to avoid upsetting a particular market structure. 
These differences are important in assessing the type of 
conflicts which are likely to emerge and the strategies which the 
various parties will use in an attempt to resolve the conflict in its 
own interests. The actual conflicts which may emerge may vary in their 
intensity. At the one extreme a situation may arise where all of the 
parties gain acceptable shares of the surplus which arises from a • 
transfer and conflict is centred around points of detail rather than 
more fundamental issues. At the other extreme, where one or more of 
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the partners is an absolute loser as a result of the transfer,^ conflict 
may be more fundamental and it might be in the interests of one or more 
of the parties to withdraw from the transaction altogether. 
The Involvement of the State 
The major sphere of activity for many of the suppliers of 
technology may be in other developed economies. In these cases conflict 
is concentrated between the supplier and recipient, and the host-state is 
5 
seldom involved. Yet in transfers to underdeveloped economies the 
host-state assumes a far more important role and in many cases the 
conflict arises between the supplier and host-state and not the recipient. 
Girvan (14) relates the role of the host-state in the bauxite 
industry to pre-colonial patterns, where the crown controlled the natural 
resources. After independence, the state has assumed this role of the 
crown and has therefore come to be directly involved in the transfer 
process itself. But there are other potential reasons, particularly in 
the manufacturing sector, for the potential interposition of the state in 
the transfer of technology,-such as: (l) The ^surplus- arising from the 
transfer may be a major source of taxable revenue which^enables the state 
to operate and to"finance further innovations. (2)' The foreign" exchange 
arising "from" the transfer "(as in" the case-of" export-oriented foreign 
investment)"may" be a major source of scarce foreign"exchange;" or, 
alternatively the transfer itself may make demands on"scarce foreign 
exchange resources and therefore be worthy of monitoring. 
(3) The absence of a national bourgeoisie - especially in economies"which 
have only recently become independent, but also in socialist societies -
may force the state "to take""an important entrepreneurial rolev 
(4) The national" bourgeoisie may pressure the"state into - conflict with the 
technology-supplier, as it may require more 'clout' if conflict is to be 
resolved in its favour. 
4» One .feasible, situation may_.be where there_is_a net loss to the . 
economy in.foreign exchange which.outweighs the. advantage, to the host-state 
of a particular investment because the social rate of return of this scarce 
foreign exchange may have been higher in an alternative investment. 
5- With the exception of Japan. 
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Vernon, amongst others, supports the idea that the host-state is 
more likely to be in conflict with the technology-supplier than the host-
partner: "...the motives behind the desire for national control differ 
according to the country and the groups within the country espousing such 
control. As a rule, the desire- for control comes most strongly out of the 
government sector." (46, p. 336) 
In spite of this empirical evidence that the host-state is 
predominant in opposition to the technology-supplier -(See- Robbins and 
Stobaugh(33) and Aharoni (l).)> it is important not to represent the state 
as the representative of a homogeneous set of class interests. On the 
contrary, the state is more often made up of diverse groups which may have 
common interests in some areas and divergent interests in other areas, as 
in the case of the Allende Government in Chile where a common interest in 
controlling foreign capital was in contrast to~a conflict of "interests with 
respect to land reform. In other cases,particularly in large parts of 
Africa and Asia, the host-state and the technology-supplier may have a 
symbiotic relationship in which each depends upon the close cooperation of 
the other, often against the interests of the mass of the population. 
The Importance of Control 
Where a conflict of interests arises between the technology-supplier 
and the host-partner and/or host-state, control-becomes important.' For 
example if all parties are in complete agreement with regard to the level 
and direction of export sales, it does not really matter who makes the actual 
decisions in this respect. But if, on the other hand, the host-state is 
concerned to maximise exports, and the technology-supplier to minimise 
exports (which may threaten an existing subsidiary's role or lead to a 
decrease in the firm's aggregate profits), control over the decision to 
export becomes critical. 
In any case, there may be a number of issues of mutual interest, 
and a number of issues where conflict arises to a greater or lesser degree. 
In the latter case, the conflicts may be resolved in a number of ways. At 
the one extreme they may be so fundamental, and the net advantage to one or 
10 -
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both parties may be so small or even negative, that the relationship may 
break up altogether. Or' the conflicts may be resolved along a continuum 
of dispute until all parties concerned consider that the best possible 
bar-gain has been struck, and the balance of advantage is sufficiently 
large to make the continued relationship worthwhile. 
Precisely at what-point the" balance "finally comes to rest is 
a-reflection of the-power which the various-parties-have." -This""power 
gives "them-the~-ability-to control "the conflict and ensure that the 
maximum possible benefit is actually attained. 
The Source of Power 
The concept of power receives rather weak treatment in the 
literature on conflict andcontrol-in the-transfer"of technology. 
Conventionally the" discussion of power has been rooted in a-number of areas J 
particularly, attention has been focussed on monopolistic" control" over" " 
scarce raw materials, equity ownership-and"military strength-as-the sources 
of economic power* Let us take a brief look at each of these three 
approaches. 
Monopolistic Control over Scarce Raw Materials; This approach has received 
particular prominence since the 'oil crisis
5
 of 1973® It is argued that 
monopolistic control over existing oil resources has fundamentally altered 
the balance of power in favour of the existing oil producers. There is no 
doubt that, in the short run particularly, there will be a substantial 
transfer of resources from oil consuming to oil producing economies. But 
the extent of the power of the producing countries depends critically upon 
the elasticity cf supply of oil, and the elasticity of substitution of other 
forms of energy. In the short run it is doubtlessly true that these 
elasticities are low, but in the longer run it is probable that other, 
perhaps more costly, sources of oil will emerge and
p
 at the same time, the 
relatively high cost of oil as a source of energy will lead to the 
substitution of other sources of energy. Command over investible resources 
which effect both elasticities is of course in the hands of the multinational 
corporations of the developed countries rather than the oil exporting countries. 
- 11 -
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In these circumstances it is not entirely clear that the 'balance 
of power' has fundamentally altered. This is best illustrated by 
reference to two, amongst many, conclusions. Firstly, the assertion by 
Saudi Arabia and Iran.that they will become major industrial powers shows 
a lack of understanding of accumulation in the world economy. Even if 
they purchase the most modern automobile and steel plants in the world, 
they do not necessarily control innovation in these sectors and may well 
find themselves technologically backward in the'"space of a decade or more. 
Secondly, oil, because of its importance to developed industrial economies 
and the lack of readily available substitutes, represents the limitations 
rather than the possibilities of monopolistic control over raw materials. 
By contrast, for example, copper is faced with substitution by aluminium, 
and within aluminium, bauxite as a raw material is faced with competition 
from an already known technology using certain clays widely available in 
Europe and America. 
Equity Ownership: This is sometimes argued to be both a source and a 
reflection of power in the transfer of technology. While it is clearly 
correct that equity control usually mirrors the balance of power, it is 
not often the source of power in the transfer of technology. Control 
can frequently be exercised, particularly in the form of management 
contracts, when little or no equity is held by the dominant technology-
supplier. Stopford and Wells address themselves to this problem in the 
context of transfers between developed countries: 
The distinction between majority and minority is, of course, 
rather artificial. In some cases the multinational 
enterprise may have management control even though it owns 
less than 50 percent of the shares. Control may be exercised 
through a management contract, or the local shares may be 
divided among local parties who do not bond together. It is 
also possible that the local partners.may have effective 
control over some ventures where the foreign investor has more 
than half the stock, (40, p. 5
S
 footnote 8) 
This point" "is made'in relation to transfers between "developed economies. 
In the case of" transfers between developed" "and-underdeveloped' economies, 
it is hardly likely that"'control m a y b e exercised t y a "domestic minority 
ownership. But -their "general point that equity may not reflect effective 
control is undoubtedly correct. 
IDS/DP 224 
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Military Strength: This has also been suggested as a primary source of 
power. At a superficial level this has obvious validity in terms of sheer 
physical power. The expenditure of vast sums of money in some underdeveloped 
countries is often justified by the argument that it will enable the country 
to become
 9
independent
9
0
 It is open to question, however, what sort of 
independence is obtained when many of the critical decisions which affect 
the rate and type of accumulation which takes place in the economy are 
made by technology-suppliers, often in collaboration with a cooperative 
host-partner® 
A different approach to these perspectives on the source of power 
has been suggested in this paper. This is that power in the resolution of 
conflict must be related to the ability to control accumulation in the 
enterprise. There are a number of factors which are necessary to enable 
this accumulation to take place. Once financial resources for an 
investment have been secured, the investor needs to take account of three 
considerations. The first is to obtain the necessary inputs, such as raw 
materials, skilled labour and suitable infrastructure. Inevitably these 
concern the host-state
5
 and, as we shall seej this is an important sphere 
in which the state can attempt to exercise control. The second problem 
concerns the transformation-of these inputs into an acceptable product. 
Of primary importance, here, is the technology available to the investor. 
Since the technology-supplier's main advantage lies in its proprietary 
control over this technology, this is an important sphere of control for 
the supplier. Finally, the output must be disposed of. In some cases, 
particularly in final consumption goods, the technology-supplier will 
control these market outlets; in other cases, the market will be relatively 
'free'. 
Insofar- as each of the parties has effective control over one or 
more of these three considerations with respect to the investment, it may 
be said that its power to settle conflict in its favour' is derived from 
this control. The objective of the holders of this power is to attempt 
to maintain and reinforce this power, while the other parties will 
. obviously attempt to change the balance in their own favour. To some 
extent the technology-supplier will by definition exercise power over one 
or more of these aspects of production
9
 otherwise it would not be involved 
in the transfer at all. But the precise balance of power will change over 
time and will vary between countries, sectors and products. The important 
issue here is that the power to resolve conflicts will necessarily relate 
- 13 -
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back to these considerations which are essential to enable accumulation 
to take place. Power is therefore ultimately related to control over 
accumulation. 
This approach on the source of power differs from each of the 
more conventional approaches discussed above. The control over scarce 
raw materials is only a partial perspective. Obviously it is an 
important consideration in accumulation, but it is essentially only 
part of the problem, and in spite of the prominence given to the power 
of the OPEC countries, it is of only limited importance in the accumulation 
of physical capital. Equity ownership only really tells us about the 
form in which control is exercised and has little to tell us about the 
source of power. Finally, the exercise of military power needs to be 
backed by a developed, innovating industrial system. There is a high 
rate of change in advanced weapons - new missiles must be countered by 
new sophisticated decoys, and so on. So while it is not true that control 
over a technically sophisticated capital stock necessarily leads to military 
power, it is nevertheless unlikely that military power can be exercised in 
the absence of a technologically sophisticated and expanding economy. 
Power in Particular Circumstances 
The argument so far has been that the power to resolve conflict 
essentially arises from power to control accumulation. But in addition to 
this general point there are a number of specific factors relating to 
accumulation in the global economy which are relevant in particular 
situations and which modify the general point made above. These particular 
factors are relevant for each, of the three parties. We shall however only 
concentrate on the technology—supplier and briefly discuss some of the factors 
which may influence its behaviour in specific cases. The reason for choosing 
the technology-supplier and not the host-state and/or host-partner is that it 
is important to throw some light on the extent to which factors not specific 
to a particular economy will influence the nature of conflict and its 
resolution. The host-state and host-partner are largely influenced by 
considerations specific to a particular economy. The technology-supplier, 
by contrast, is maximising accumulation at the world level and its behaviour 
is thus modified by these global considerations. 
- 14 -
IDS/Dp 224. 
• • In mast"cases, the technology-supplier is operating within a 
competitive oligopolistic market structure in a world of risk. Its 
competitive behaviour is characterised by three factors - a rapid rate of 
innovation (which obviously varies over time and between sectors), 
'aggressive'action or 'defensive' reaction, and risk aversion. Let us 
briefly examine each in turn: 
(1) Rapid.rate of innovation. Girvan refers to one element of this 
process as "the planned incremental displacement of its main product line 
with another". (13) This product differentiation results from the income 
elasticity of demand for the product, as well as the reaction to a 
competitive threat. But, aside from the need to produce new products, 
innovation is also spurred by the quest to reduce unit costs of production 
or excessive dependence on a particular input. 
(2) 'Aggressive/defensive*behaviour. Existence in a competitive 
oligopolistic market is much like rolling a heavy object up a steep hill -
either one pushes forward or one rolls back. Thus the firm either moves 
ahead or falls behind with respect to its rivals and this frequently 
involves the transfer of technology to underdeveloped countries. As we 
have seen, one way of moving forward is to innovate. Another way, however, 
is to"integrate vertically"by taking over suppliers"or recipients of one's 
product. ' For many technology-suppliers,"and particularly for"those" involved 
in the processing"of raw materials,"vertical integration means expansion 
overseas. This is graphically put by Girvan in describing the vertical 
integration of the aluminium companies: 
Independent miners in the Metropole and Hinterlands alike 
were transformed into wage labourers, and small capitalists 
into minority stockholders of the large corporations. For 
the miners of Montana the enemy, became the '.'capitalist!!, from.. . .. 
New York, for the Venezuelans and Chileans it was to become the 
"foreign capitalists". Both, perhaps unconsciously, were attacking 
the same historical development . (12, p. 506) 
(3) Risk aversion. Faced with the need to move overseas, and with the 
variable and changing political climate in other countries, many 
technology-suppliers are concerned to avert risk. This risk-aversion 
takes a number of forms: for some raw material producers, the strategy is 
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"the planned displacement of existing sources of supply", (12) that is, 
to ensure that they are never dependent upon one or a few suppliers. 
There are other forms of risk aversion (such as the organised involvement 
of international organisations in the agreement , diversification into 
other products and the commitment of as little real capital as possible), 
some of which we shall discuss in the latter part of this paper. 
The particular power of technology-suppliers and their motivation 
to transfer technology is not only affected by the general context of 
competitive oligopolistic market structures, but it is also a function of 
the particular motivation of the supplier to transfer its technology. Some 
of these particular reasons are: 
(1) The quest for surplus. Much of the traditional literature on foreign 
investment observes that, while rates of return in underdeveloped countries 
are higher than those in developed countries,' (seldom by more than a factor 
of two), this is not an unduly high rate of return given the risk of foreign 
investment in the Third World. By contrast, some of the more recent detailed 
micro-economic research has concluded that effective rates of return on 
foreign investment are substantially higher than declared rates of return. 
These high rates of return provide-much of the surplus required to finance 
accumulation. The relevance of this point for the control of conflict in 
any particular situation is that at any one time the firm may have a particular 
need for dividends, resources -for
-
research-and-development, funding of 
investment, the financing of another subsidiary, etc., which affect the 
optimal timing and extent of return from the transfer of technology. Thus, 
for example, if the firm has a particular need for funds in a particular 
year, the host partner or host state may be in an unusually strong position 
to obtain, a concession it particularly wants to achieve. 
(2) The quest for raw materials. This is obviously an important 
motivation for raw material producers and processors. There are two needs 
here: the need to obtain a reliable and adequate flow~of raw materials,' and 
the-requira*ent"of--alternative suppliers to provide flexibilityof sources ' 
of supply-to the raw-material user. " (12-)- -Thus," 'if the technology-supplier -
has a critical need for adequate raw materials or (by contrast) has a variety 
of sources of the raw material, this will have an important effect on its 
bargaining power in any particular situation. 
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(3) The quest for markets. There are two forms of markets which are 
required. The first is for the final output of the firm, and the second 
is for the new or used capital equipment of the firm.^ Frequently both 
markets are sought at the same t i m e - Vaitsos, for example, found that in 
the Colombian pharmaceutical sector, technology which had been supplied 
was tied to the use of particular branded intermediate products. This 
tied clause was an important avenue for transfer pricing in Colombia as 
there was a bar on the level of profits which the companies were permitted 
to remit. 
(4) The quest for spreading research and development costs. Research 
and development expenditure is characterised by high minimum levels of 
activity and great economies of scale. As a result there is a considerable 
incentive to spread these research-and development costs. This can be done 
in a variety of ways - by royalties on output, by a subsidiary's'contribution' 
to research and development costs, by the capitalisation of know-how, and so 
on. 
(5) The quest for an export base. In the case of an established product 
with an established market, there may be incentives to situate production 
overseas. Vernon (46) has characterised this as the 'product-cycle theory' 
where production is situated overseas in the 'mature phase' of the product. 
One variant of this phenomenon is
-
that of the runaway industries, where the 
labour intensive components of a process (e.g. the punching of computer cards) 
are done in a cheap-labour economy.(16) 
6. In a vertically integrated firm, new equipment may be both an output 
and an input. 
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We have paid some attention to the international context of the 
technology-supplier in order to illustrate our assertion that power in 
the transfer of technology varies in different situations and, to a 
considerable extent, the power of-the technology-supplier is not just 
a function of its control over a particular technique, but also a 
function of the world context within which the accumulation takes place. 
Insofar as the host-partner and/or host-state are and have been 
related to the international context of accumulation in the production 
of a particular product, its power too may be contingent upon the 
international context of innovation. For example, Faber and Potter 
point out that the partial nationalisation of the Zambian copper mines 
in 1969 took place in the context of a world shortage of skilled mining 
engineers. As a result, the government's bargaining position was 
severely weakened by the inability to call upon alternative sources of 
technical knowledge. (11, chapter 4) 
More pertinently, and certainly more intangibly, is the 
relationship of the host-partner•and/or host-state to international 
capital in general. Puerto Rico, for example, has a rather special 
relationship with the U.S., which gives it special access to capital 
and technology. To what extent a series of past agreements between 
the host-state, the U.S. government and U.S. corporations binds the 
power of Puerto Rico partners in any particular agreement is not 
precisely clear, but it does suggest that there may be only limited 
room for manoeuvre before the special relationship to the U.S. economy 
is adversely affected. 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION: ISSUES OF CONFLICT IN THE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL 
THROUGH TRANSFERRED TECHNOLOGY 
- - - We have hitherto argued that"power "to"Tesolve conflict in 
favour of-any-one~of the three relevant parties relates to"the ability 
to control-accumulation.
-
 " This involves"controI over the'supply of inputs, 
control over-the transformation of these inputs"into products'and" the 
disposal of this output. Conflict arises in each of these three aspects 
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of accumulation. Conflict, however, is not confined to accumulation 
and also centres around the distribution of benefits arising from 
accumulation and other general policy considerations of each of the 
three parties. But in the case of these latter considerations, the 
power to resolve conflict stems from control over accumulation. 
Streeton (1973) lists a number of issues of potential conflict, 
but warns of the dangers in presenting a 'laundry list' in an analytical 7 
void. It is hoped that the ensuing discussion avoids these pitfalls. 
An attempt was made in the earlier section to situate power in an analytical 
context. In this section, potential conflict will be related to this earlier 
discussion and will be discussed in five sections. These are: the availability 
of inputs, the transformation of these inputs, the disposal of output, 
distribution of surplus and other sources of conflict. 
The Availability of Inputs 
Source of Finance for Accumulation: Considerable evidence has been 
accumulated to show that one of the primary aims of the technology-suppliers 
is to minimise future cash outlays to a subsidiary particularly where the 
host currency is likely to depreciate. (31) As a result, strenuous 
efforts are made to obtain domestic sources of finance for accumulation. 
Vernon estimates that on a worldwide scale, U.S. multinational corporations' 
subsidiaries obtain roughly 25 per cent of resources from the parent, 30 per 
cent through reinvested profits from the subsidiary and 45 per cent is raised 
from local credit sources. As one of the primary reasons for .local-borrowing 
is to protect against currency depreciations and other risks, and investments 
in underdeveloped countries are altogether more risky than those in developed 
countries, it is likely that the actual gearing ratio in underdeveloped 
countries is substantially higher than Vernon suggests. 
The result therefore is that there has been a substantial 
overestimation of the contribution of the technology-supplier of the 
finance necessary to enable accumulation. When this gearing is
-
 allied to 
potential overestimation of the value of capital-in-kind and capitalised know-how, 
7. The approach of listing under various headings the merits and draw-
backs of the MNE fi.e. multinational enterprise] (which might be 
described as the laundry?list approach) is common but unsatisfactory. 
What would be more satisfactory is an analytical framework in which 
these various possibilities are accommodated, possibly classified 
according to relevant criteria, and then filled with empirical, 
quantitative content. (39» p. 4) 
IDS/DP 2 2 4 
-19 -
there is likely to be substantial areas of conflict between the supplier 
and the recipients of technology with regard to the provision of finance 
for accumulation
0 
Access to Local CreditsWe have seen (8) that the interest of the technology-
supplier lies in increasing the extent of local borrowing in both capital 
and operating expenditure, particularly in an economy with a depreciating 
currency,, To the extent that there is a savings gap in the economy, this 
is in conflict with the interests of the host-state'and host-partner, for 
it means that there will be less credit available for domestic entrepreneurs 
or the host-partner in its other activities. 
Because of the security which the technology-supplier is able 
to offer as a backing to its borrowing, and because it has access to 
sources of credit not available to local entrepreneurs, credit facilities 
are frequently pre-empted by the suppliers of technology. Not only are 
these resources pre-empted, but this credit is often obtained on 
preferential terms, so that local borrowers are put at a disadvantage in 
relation to the foreign-based suppliers of technology. This phenomenon is 
a problem to the host-state if the social rate of return of these resources 
is higher in an alternative project. But even if this is not the case, the 
host-state may nevertheless be pressured to act by the local bourgeoisie 
which would like command over these resources. 
Price of Inputs: Allied to control over the source of inputs is"conflict' 
over the price of inputs. In some cases, the firm"demands absolute control 
over the source of inputs as a means to pricing inputs in"such a way to 
9 
allow for the repatriation of "surplus in a disguised-form." " There" may, in 
addition, be conflict over the pricing of domestically procured inputs such 
as water, electricity, coal and so on. 
Another"major source of conflict may-arise wittrrespect to payment 
to labour. Technology-transferred from developed countries"tends to be 
relatively capital-intensive." 'In addition "it ""is "oft en utilised "within an 
uncompetitive market structure; "As" a result in-order~to avoid"conflict with 
labour it may be""in""the interests
-
of the 'technology-supplier "to pay high 
wages "and'salaries"to local employees and pass~these higher-costs' on to 
consumers. That is, with little real cost to the technology-supplier, its 
9» This concerns not only the overpricing of intermediate inputs, 
but also the capitalisation of know-how and the price charged for capital 
good inputs. 
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continued operation and expansion in the host-country may be backed by a 
"loyal and co-operative
1
 work force. By contrast the host-state may 
(although it seldom does) have an interest in ensuring that local wages 
are not too high, as these high earnings are a further inducement to 
urbanisation and uneven development in the country. 
Transformation of Inputs 
The Rate and Type of Accumulation; We have suggested so far
1
 that power 
to resolve conflict is related to accumulation which takes place in both 
the underdeveloped and the world economy. Particular interests may vary 
widely here - for the major oil producing countries, for example, the 
expressed interest is to keep the oil in the ground, while the extracting 
companies are concerned to increase the flow of oil. This is in contrast with 
the situation which existed in the Zambian copper mines in the late 1960s: 
in this case it was the companies which were less keen to accumulate and to 
expand output than the host-state. 
Similar problems arise in the manufacturing sector. This is 
particularly the case where a particular subsidiary, while its output may 
be competitively priced in the world market, is not the lowest-marginal-cost 
producer in the multinational" corporation."^" The host-state or host-producer 
may therefore wish to expand production through new capacity to enable exports, 
while the technology-supplier may be satisfied to install only that equipment 
which is necessary to serve the home (or regional) market. 
Conflict arises not only with regard to the rate of accumulation of 
technology required to produce a particular product, but also with regard to 
the type of accumulation which is to take place. One of the major areas of 
conflict which emerged in the nationalisation of the Zambian copper mines was 
the use to which investible resources could be put. The Agreement provided an 
effective veto to the companies (whose equity shareholding fell from 100 per-
cent to 49 per cent) in this respect: it was specified that reinvested profits 
10. For example, if the world_price of generators is £100, the cif cost 
in an Indian subsidiary is £90 and that in a German subsidiary of the same firm 
is £88, then the firm will obviously prefer to expand output in the German, 
rather than the Indian subsidiary, even though the latter is producing 
generators below the world price. 
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were to be confined to the mining sector and effectively enabled the 
minority directors to specify that all profits should be remitted as 
dividends rather than reinvested in new equipment. The financing of 
subsequent expansion therefore had to take place from external 
borrowings.
1 1 
This conflict may concern not only the type of product which 
is to be produced but also the type of technology which is used to 
produce these products. In some cases (where, for example, the 
technology-supplier requires interchangeability of output between 
subsidiaries), it is the multi-national corporation which wants to 
use the most modern equipment to produce a sophisticated product. In 
other cases (particularly where the transfer is to enable import 
substitution, where the technology-supplier wants an outlet for used 
machinery and no threat to established export markets), it is
-
the" 
multi-national corporation which may want to use less modern equipments 
11. Kenneth Kaunda (24). In the Articles of Association of the 
newly formed companies, the minority shareholders' directors ('B' 
directors) where given the veto over: 
the engaging by RCM or NCCM in any business or activities 
of a nature substantially different to the mining companies 
take over, or the expenditure by RCM or NCCM of any funds 
not in the ordinary course of its business, or the making 
of any financial commitments in respect of any new mining 
operation or facility or the expansion of an existing mining 
operation or facility in respect of which commitments or 
expansion RCM or NCCM is unable to raise such monies as may 
be required on commercially competitive terms or in respect 
of which the 'B' directors are not satisfied of the commercial 
validity. 
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Level and Composition of Output: The international context within which a 
transfer is made is an important determinant of the conflict over the level 
and composition of output. The types of conflict which may emerge in this 
context are complex. With regard to output, there may be conflict centring 
around the existence and size of exports. Or the conflict may arise in the 
context of the technology-supplier
9
s broader international interests. In 
the case of copper production in Chile, the host-state was for many years 
unable to persuade the companies to expand output, despite a series of 
incentives, - It-was
-
-only-when the international-operations of"these firms 
provided a requirement for a greater flow of copper, that they agreed to 
expand output. (13) 
There may also be conflict with regard to the nature and quality of 
output. The usual case arises when the technology-supplier specifies' 
a higher quality and more sophisticated product than the market demands. 
There may be three reasons for this action. Firstly, as in the case of 
the Cummins venture in India (2), the technology-supplier may require 
12 
interchangeability of output between various world-wide subsidiaries. 
Secondly, it may be in the interests of protecting its brand names, or as 
a conscious element of a product differentiation policy, for the technology
0
-
supplier to specify this type of product„ Or, thirdly, the nature and 
training of managerial staff may be a factor influencing the quality of 
output: in Kenya
9
 for example, a company makes shoe-polish tins to a more 
strict specification than those made in its U.K. subsidiary, because^the 
shoe-polish manufacturing firm in Kenya specifies a need for these tins, 
even though there is no particular call for such carefully specified tins 
in the Kenyan market. 
Maintenance of Technological Monopoly: The transformation of inputs into 
final output frequently requires the use of imported technology® The 
proprietary rights over this technology are generally owned by the 
technology-supplier and It is this which is commonly the basis of its 
power. It is consequently in the interest of the technology-supplier to 
maintain, this monopoly position so that it may continue to control 
conflicts which arise. 
12. Vaitsos gives as an example of this type of product a Volkswagen 
door. 
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In order to maintain this control in situations of conflict, the 
technology-supplier seeks to maintain its monopoly over technological 
change® This is basically ensured in two ways. Firstly the inventive 
process is centred in the developed countries, and particularly in the 
country of the head office* The underdeveloped country subsidiaries 
perform few institutionalised inventive activities: those they do perform 
tend to be predominantly of the 'trouble-shooting' variety. As a result, 
the process of skill formation in underdeveloped countries is centred on 
operational skills (for example, supervisory), back-up skills (that is, 
maintenance and repair) and occasionally adaptive skills. More 
fundamental inventive skills, as -we have
-
'seen, tend to be centred in 
developed countries and the underdeveloped country subsidiaries remain 
dependent upon technical change controlled by the head office. 
The host-state and the host-partner, by contrast, may be concerned 
to break this relationship of dependence. This entails a conflict of 
interests in both areas discussed above - the situation of, and 
proprietary rights over, technical change and the generation of local 
inventive skills. 
Disposal of Output 
Size and Direction of'Exports: As the balance of payments deficit of 
many underdeveloped countries has increased with continued import 
substituting industrialisation, so has there been a growth in the 
orientation of development policies to export promotion. This desire 
for increasing exports has frequently been in conflict with the 
interests of the technology-suppliers. This conflict has taken two 
major forms. The first concerns the size of the export-flows and the 
second relates to a desire to affect the direction of these exports. 
The host-state may wish to influence the direction of exports because it 
may increase the price received for the product, because it may increase 
the size of potential markets, and because the government may have"more 
general strategic political interests, such as increasing trade with 
Eastern Europe. The "technology-supplier may resist these"policies 
because they stand in conflict with the international competitive 
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strategy of the firm. As part of this strategy, the head office may have 
delineated regional 'spheres of influence' to particular subsidiaries, 
or it may have a lower-cost alternative supplier which can serve the 
same market to the ultimate benefit of the firm. 
Price of Output; The most usual form of conflict with regard to the price 
of output concerns the transfer of products within a vertically integrated 
firm. The prices which are used for these transfers are often a major 
avenue for a subsidiary to receive - or transmit financial resources to 
another subsidiary or to the head office. In some cases the goods which 
are transferred are freely available on the world market and an 'arms-
length' price may be used by the technology-supplier, but in many cases 
these transfers consist of intermediates which have no established world 
price - in this case, no arms-length price may exist. Even where arms-
length prices do exist for a product, the level of detail of each transfer 
may ensure that the host-state and partner have no effective access to 
knowledge of this price. 
Distribution of Surplus 
Dividend Policies; Closely allied to potential conflict over the rate of 
accumulation and the source of surplus for accumulation is policy on 
dividends. The evidence to hand suggests that the interest of the 
technology-suppliers is frequently to cut down the payback period. Baranson 
( 2 )), in his investigation of the joint venture between Cummins Desel 
(a U.S. firm) and Kirloskar (an Indian firm), cites one of the major 
conflicts in a conflict-ridden venture to have been policy over dividends -
Cummins wanted an early return' on'capital invested, whereas the Indian 
partner was primarly interested in growth. 
A similar conflict of interest is shown in the case of the 
nationalisation of Zambian "copper mines." Compensation was based on 
the book value of the-assets
-
at the end
-
of 1969," with repayment" spread 
over 12 years in one case and 8 years in the" other." In""the event,~ 
however, of a sharp rise in the price of copper, repayment was to be 
13 
speeded up. This would bear out the assertion which Baranson makes in 
13• It is interesting to note that there was no provision for a 
slowing down in the repayment of dividends in the event of a sharp 
fall in the price of copper. 
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that the mining firms preferred a short payback period and were 
restrained in. the initial agreement by the low price of copper<> 
This leads us to a clear conflict of interests in dividend 
policy
0
 Given the high discount rate which tends to be used by the 
multinationals, it obviously makes sense to receive dividends as soon 
as possible, even at the sacrifice of total undiscounted profitso 
Because of the low rate of time preference which it often uses, the 
host-state (but less seldom the host-partner) would more likely opt 
for greater total undiscounted profits, even though their dividends 
may be spread over a longer period of time
0 
Foreign Exchange Repatriation; In a hypothetical situation of no risk 
and no uncertainty, with an-equal" rate of inflation and technical change 
in all economies, there would be no preference for holding current assets 
in any particular currency, other than that of convenience,, But, clearly, 
the real world is far removed from this hypothetical example„ 
For the technology-supplier the major problem concerns risk and 
uncertainty
0
 There are two strands to this problem,, The major problem, 
particularly in recent years, concerns the depreciation of the host 
currency,, If there
-
"is a "positive current-asset balance in the host country, 
devaluation of the host-currency will-lead"to a fall" in the present worth 
of the subsidiary" in the
-
head office's unit of account; "Conversely," if" -
there is a negative current-asset balance in the host-country, devaluation 
of that currency will lead to an increase in the present worth of the 
subsidiary in the head office's unit of account„ Given that underdeveloped 
countries are often characterised by a depreciating currency, the policy of 
the technology-supplier is thus to repatriate earnings as soon as possible 
and to increase local borrowing to avoid the risk of devaluations For the 
host-state, the interest clearly lies in delaying and minimising the 
outflow of foreign exchange as devaluation will increase the foreign 
exchange value of a debt negotiated in local currency by the technology-
supplier and, at the same time, reduce the foreign exchange cost of 
repatriated earnings
0 
14= See the discussion on sources of finance for accumulation above. 
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The second problem of the technology-supplier arises from the risk 
of committing resources to an underdeveloped country where a changing 
political structure may affect the reliability of returns from the 
subsidiary. Once again the logical answer to this problem lies in speeding-
up the repatriation of foreign exchange, and in insuring against this risk 
15 
in other ways (such as referring disputes to an outside arbitrator^ 
The recipient underdeveloped economy -is frequently characterised by 
a shortage of foreign exchange. The degree of this problem may range from 
the mild (e.g. Kenya) to the extreme (e.g. Sri Lanka), but in all cases the 
policy conclusion for the host-state is to attempt to delay and minimise 
payment of foreign exchange, particularly where foreign debts are negotiated 
in the local currency. Although there are a wide range of feasible policies 
to attain this goal (such as the ceiling on profits"which"the"Colombian 
Government attempted to enforce after 1968), there is a considerable body of 
evidence which suggests that the technology-suppliers are able to circumvent 
16 
these regulations with a great deal of success. 
We are faced here with a clear conflict of interests between the 
technology-supplier and the host-state. Not only is it one of the most 
often expressed conflicts, but the very act of resolution by the technology-
supplier has the effect of increasing the severity of the conflict. That is, 
since the likelihood of devaluation depends upon the balance of payments 
deficit, and since this deficit is partly a-consequence of the actions of 
technology-suppliers to protect themselves against devaluation, a vicious 
circle is established through both parties acting in their' own interests. 
15. This policy will be discussed in greater detail later in this paper. 
16. We shall discuss this, problem in a later section on transfer-accounting. 
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Tax Payments: There are a variety of taxes which the host state can use to 
increase its share of the surplus which is generated through accumulation. 
The most general form of tax relates to profits through corporation tax,
1
^ 
but this can be supplemented by a variety of other taxes on output (e.g. the 
old Zambian Minerals Tax), imports (i.e. tariffs), exports and so on. These 
vary with specific • circumstances:" for "example an export tax may be imposed when 
the country has a virtual monopoly over the supply of a product. 
To the extent that these taxes can be used effectively to increase 
the share of the host-state, this may be an important area of conflict. But, 
as we shall see in a later discussion on transfer- accounting, there are a 
variety of mechanisms which the technology-supplier can use to avoid and evade 
these tax payments. The success of this transfer accounting can be gauged 
from the empirical studies on the motivation of foreign investment, which 
invariably conclude that investment in underdeveloped countries is seldom 
affected by government policies of providing tax holidays, and so on. 
Thus Streeten concludes:" "There is almost universal evidence that foreign 
investors say that tax concessions and pioneer status play no or only an 
18 
insignificant part in bringing them to the country." 
The Burden of Joint Venture Costs: When the technology-supplier is" engaged 
in a joint venture with the host-state or host-partner, conflict frequently 
arises with regard to the burden of costs. There are two basic costs here. 
The first is infrastructural costs which are generally born by the host-state, 
typically these include the construction and improvement of transport networks, 
capital expenditure on the provision of water, electricity and so on. There 
is unlikely to be extensive conflict with regard to the burden of infra-
structural expenditure, although it is sometimes argued that effective 
profits are high enough to enable the technology-supplier to bear these costs. 
Presumably the 'correct' answer would be to more effectively tax these 
excess profits and use this revenue to fund infrastructural costs, rather 
than to expect the technology-supplier to make these expenditures itself. 
17« The size of this tax is affected, inter alia, by the type and extent 
of depreciation allowances. 
18. Streeten, (39), p. 10. See also Aharoni, (l). There are some 
exceptions to this, such as Puerto Rico and Ireland, which are well placed 
with respect to large export markets (i.e. the U.S. and the E.E.C. 
respectively). 
- 28 
IDS/DP 224 
The second type of cost is the provision of inputs. Here there 
is more likely to be extensive conflict. The general form of agreement, is 
not so much that the host-state or host-partner actually provides inputs 
such as timber, land and water free of charge, but that the technology-
supplier is granted access to these resources at a 'subsidised' cost. That 
is, if these same resources were to be used in an alternative way, the supplier 
of these inputs would obtain, a higher return on the resources® 
Thus Girvan concludes in relationship to bauxite mining: 
Another noteworthy point about, special agreements (with regard 
to exploration rights), is that they provide..for- the..accessibility 
not only of bauxite, but_of other natural, resources, as well®. In 
a. large .number of .cases the companies..are given. a_carte blanche _ 
to use from Government lands in their_concession area.,, such, 
resources as water, timber and sand and gravel which may be needed 
in the operation associated with exploring the bauxite. (14, P° 395) 
Other Sources of Conflict 
Attitude to Domestic and Foreign Competition: The extent to which the 
technology supplier"is operating in a non-competitive market-largely 
determines the effective profit which arises from the"transfer. "The" 
interest of the supplier "is" therefore "to create a monopolistic structure. 
There are a number of ways in which this can be done, three of which"are 
more generally used. The first of these is "to negotiate""with""the host-state 
or partner exclusive "rights to a given operation." " This m a y b e exclusive~ 
exploration and production"rights for'the provision of a"particular input,^ 
or it may be the exclusive right" of producing that commodity" in the 
country. " The" second avenue is to negotiate a tariff' structure with the 
host-state which on the one hand provides a high level of effective protection 
against foreign competitors, and on the other reduces the tariffs on imported 
inputs used by the technology-supplier» Finally, the technology-supplier may 
act as a product differentiator. Through heavy expenditure on advertising, 
a brand-name loyalty is created amongst consumers and the technology-supplier 
thereby operates in a non- (or less) competitive market structure. 
By contrast, the interest of the host-state may lie in increasing 
the competitive nature of the market
s
 which may result in lower profits 
and unit prices. The host-partner's interests may lie in either direction. 
On the one hand it may be closely tied in with the technology-supplier and 
19° A's in Vkrtsosfs investigation of the Colombian pharmaceutical industry. 
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may receive a share of total effective profits: in this case its interests 
also lie in reducing the competitive nature of the market. Or, on the other 
hand, the host-partner may be a potential competitor to the technology-supplier, 
in which case its long—run interests lie in increasing the competitive nature 
of the market. 
Development Policies: Conflict may also arise in relation to general deve-
lopment policies which the host-state may-wish-to pursue. "There are a-wide 
variety of' policies "which may conflict with the" interests~of the technology-
supplier. The major ones "concern the generation of employment, the 
appropriateness of technology used, the attempt to formulate a less uneven 
path of development, the attempt to change international political alignments 
and the attempt to obtain what President Kaunda called 'economic independence', 
(quoted by Faber and Potter (ll)) 
In most cases, these general strategies may not directly influence the 
operation of the transferred technology (although this is less true of policies 
designed to increase employment). But the technology-supplier may perceive 
that its long run interests are threatened by the general orientation of these 
policies. In the extreme case, as for example in I.T.T.'s recent involvement 
in Chile, the technology-supplier may become an instigator and active political 
participant in the domestic political structure. In the less extreme cases 
too, however, the combined actions of technology - suppliers may have an 
important effect on the orientation and success of these development policies. 
Backward and Forward Linkages: Theories of industrialisation in underdeveloped 
countries place a great deal of prominence on linkages which result from 
transferred technology. (See, for example, H i r s h m a n . ) The idea is that 
either by providing' "inputs-for ~a*p>lant, or "through the - stimulation - of local 
processing or finishing activities^ the process"of industrialisation may be 
stimulated through the use of transferred technology. 
There is some reason to doubt the-extent-of the linkages which result 
20 
from this transferred'technology," for the interest of the technology-
supplier may lie in limiting the extent of these linkages. This may be for 
three reasons. Firstly, one of the main avenues for the repatriation of" 
surplus" may "lie in'the transfer"-pricing of ""inputs'"from the" technology-supplier. 
Or conversely, there may be 'hidden' external economies, such as those reported 
20. See, for example, Langdon's study on the production of detergents in 
Kenya (25). 
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by Girvan where the empty returning ships used to transport copper from 
Chile were owned by the copper companies, thereby leading to low real 
costs of transport for the firm when importing. (13) Where linkages do 
occur, this may often involve-foreign rather than local entrepreneurs. 
Secondly there may be more obvious external economies arising from 
the transferred technology which the technology-supplier wishes to 
internalise to the firnu Kaiser Aluminium, for example, has made a major 
diversification into chemicals based on the processing of Jamaican bauxite. 
Presumably that diversification could have been made in Jamaica, rather that 
the U.S.A., had Kaiser Aluminium so wished. 
Thirdly (and this partly explains the reason for Kaiser's 
diversification in the U.S.A. rather than in Jamaica), there will almost 
certainly be greater risk and uncertainty, with decreased flexibility, 
for investment in an underdeveloped country. It is this last factor which 
goes a long way to explain the seeming paradox whereby firms incur higher 
transport costs by shipping minerals and agricultural products produced in 
underdeveloped countries to developed countries for processing. 
Arbitration 
Agreements between technology-suppliers and the host-states or 
host-partners are generally associated with a mutually agreed structure 
of arbitration in the event of major conflict arising in the operation 
of technology. There are three potential areas of conflict here. 
The first concerns the situation of the body responsible for 
arbitration - is it a domestic or a foreign party? The second issue of 
conflict relates to the nature of the legal framework to be used in the 
arbitration. In some cases as we shall see later, the technology-
supplier has been able to negotiate an agreement which effectively 
'freezes' the executive powers of the host-state at the time at which 
the agreement was signed. In other cases, foreign law is considered 
to be relevant to the dispute. The final issue concerns the penalty 
which is to be exacted for breaking the agreement. 
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As we have seen, the extent to which control is wielded by either 
party reflects the balance of power in the agreement. But relative powers 
change over time and the balance of power in the agreement may alter. It 
is in the interests, therefore, of that party which is most likely to lose 
its relative power over time to freeze the agreement and increase the costs 
of reneging on the contract® It is in the case of low-technology sectors, 
such as (on-shore) petroleum extraction, mining and some services, where 
the relative power of the host-state and partner is most likely to grow over 
time, that we find these three elements of conflict most clearly specified. 
Where the balance of power is unlikely to change significantly, or 
'unfavourably^ there is little need for these steps to be taken® 
MECHANISMS FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT 
In earlier sections of this discussion we have considered the nature 
and source of power in the transfer of technology and a series of potential 
conflicts which may arise between the supplier and recipients of technology. 
Ultimately, as we have seen, control reflects the power of the dominant party 
in the transfer. What we are now concerned to show is the avenues through which 
this control may be exercised. 
There are two basic channels through which control may be exercised. 
The first channel for the exercise of power lies in the operation of the 
technology. Particular aspects of this control are financial control, 
organisational control, entrepreneurial control, managerial control, control 
over manpower and control of innovations. The second channel is the set of 
host-state policies which attempt to circumscribe the power and behaviour of 
the technology-supplier and host-partner. These policies can be divided into 
those concerning resource accessibility, those concerning operational conditions 
and those concerning the payment stream. (14) 
Control over the Entrepreneurial Function 
The primary area of importance in the exercise of control is control 
over the entrepreneurial functions of the enterprise. This follows from the 
earlier analysis in which it was argued that power was derived from control 
over accumulation. By this is meant control over decisions which affect the 
nature, level and rate of accumulation. 
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The basic instrument whereby this control is exercised is through 
the.capital budget» In a recent visit to a subsidiary of a large inter-
national firm which serves as a regional headquarters for the firm and is 
itself expanding at a very rapid rate
}
 I was informed that the subsidiary 
was unable to make any capital expenditure in excess of approximately 
£1,100 (Sterling) without the prior authority of the head office
s
 This 
enabled the head office of the firm to maintain control at a very detailed 
level with regard to the size and nature of future investment<> This 
carefully specified control measure is being used in a firm which is noted 
for the independence which is given to its subsidiaries° For example, none 
of the subsidiaries in the "region was limited in any way with regard to the 
21 
direction and size of its exportso 
Schulman makes much the same point, although he places greater 
emphasis on control over recurrent expenditure: "Budgeting is the basic device 
used by the firms in this study for control of operation,, „ ° o Budget manuals 
or instructions are issued well in advance of budget dealines."- (36 , p. 86) 
Robbins and Stobaugh argue in relation to the evaluation of subsidiary 
performance by the head office that the primary means of control Is over the 
investment budget and that these decisions are frequently approved at the 
highest levelo (339 chapter 8) Brooke and Remmers are in accordance with 
this view as well: "Control over investment represents the ultimate control 
over the operations of a'subsidiary and
p
 as such
9
 is almost always closely 
held at Head Office." (6, p
c
 105) Finally, a U
0
N
0
 study on the multinationals 
points out that even in the most loosely knit•international firm the minimal 
control or restriction which is exercised is control over the capital budget. (42) 
The evidence cited above accords with the argument that control is 
primarily rooted in accumulation,, But control over investment in plant and 
equipment is only one area of control over the entrepreneurial functions of 
the firm. The second primary area is an attempt at control 
21. Although It should be noted that the. output of" the firm had high 
unit transport costs in relation to total unit costs, there was active 
competition between subsidiaries for export marketSo 
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over accumulation by competitors. There are many elements to this competitive 
strategy. One head office policy is to obtain exclusive rights over property 
necessary for accumulation and, without using the rights, to pre-empt 
accumulation by competitors. Thus, -for example, we have the non-utilisation 
of exploration rights over 16,000 square miles south of the Zambian Copperbelt. 
A second example would be the non-implementation of patents over certain 
22 
production processes. 
Another strategy for~controlling accumulation by competitors is 
product diversification which builds up a strong loyalty amongst consumers for 
one's own product. This may have an additional advantage of providing scale 
economies: 
Firms that emphasize marketing may be able to protect themselves 
by raising the price of entry to their markets. The initial 
expenditures required by a potential competitor to gain brand 
acceptance may be very high, and the absolute amount of money 
spent on advertising is likely to be an important barrier to entry. 
The firm that can spread its expenditures on the creation of a 
brand image across a number of products may take advantage of 
scale economies. The large advertiser may get reduced rates that 
are an additional barrier to a new entrant. (40, p. 54) 
This control over product differentiation is"frequently exercised by the head 
office. Thus, for example: "Pepsi-Cola sells exactly the same product in all 
its numerous national markets and uses the same advertising and promotional 
themes in all of them." (40, pp. 56-7) 
One final area of-control in the entrepreneurial operation of the 
enterprise lies in the relationship with the host-state. This relationship is 
generally of great importance in future accumulation by the firm, and it is thus 
necessary for the negotiation to be handled by the head office. Thus where 
substantive conflict or negotiations are required the subsidiary almost always 
refers to the head office for guidance or detailed assistance. This is true 
of transfers through a joint venture, although here the technology-supplier 
may be constrained by the presence of the host-partner. More often, though, one 
of the main reasons for entering a joint venture may be that the presence of 
the host-partner -eases the relationship with the host-state. 
22. C. _Vaitsos,..(44)* . A particularly clear, example of.the use of patents 
to block.accumulation can be found._in.the_case,of the_Chilean. Copper. Mines. As 
soon. as .the host-state nationalised the mines, the firms registered a whole 
series of patents.designed to.block jfurther accumulation in. .the processing of 
the ores,, Prior to the nationalisation there was little danger of this invest-
ment as these decisions were largely controlled by the firms. 
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Control over Organisational Structure 
The degree to which the technology-supplier maintains organisational 
control over the operation of the transferred technology varies widely. Robbins 
and Stobaugh argue that the results of their empirical investigation suggest that 
the major determinant of organisational structure of the multinational 
corporation is the size of its international operations (and thus, also, its 
experience in the transfer of technology). 'Small firms', that is those 
firms with overseas -sales of less than $100 million, tend to allow foreign 
subsidiaries to operate independently. In-this case, formalised control 
measures are confined (as we have seen) to the investment decisions. In the 
'medium sized firms', that is those with international sales of less than 
$500 million, many of the subsidiaries'" operations (particularly their 
financial operations) are handled by a large head office staff. 'Large 
firms' are faced with both the advantages of centralisation and the necessity 
for local autonomy. In this case, the head office tends to issue guidelines, 
co-ordinate activities and monitor results, in addition to holding a firm 
control over capital expenditure." In this latter case, control is exercised 
through the rule book. (33, chapter 3) 
The use of these rule books, often -using the currency of the head 
office country, is a widely used control measure. For example, the African 
subsidiaries mentioned above were obliged to provide monthly reports on many 
facets of their operations to the head office. This control over the 
organisational functions of the subsidiaries'enabled the head office to 
control the international strategy of the firm as a whole, and thus also 
23 
the strategy of particular subsidiaries* In the sample of firms examined 
by Brooke and Remmers, almost all of the subsidiaries were obliged to provide 
detailed reports to the head office at least^on a quarterly timetable. (6, chapter 4) 
The degree of organisational centralisation discussed above 
must be distinguished from the organisational structure of the technology-
supplying firm as a whole. At one extreme} some international firms produce 
single lines in a few countries, at the other, firms produce many lines in 
many countries. This product and geographical dispersion, linked with the 
size of the firm's international operations-, leads to different organisational 
23. A rather interesting result of these quarterly reports used by this 
particular firm is. that, the head .office used.these ..subsidiary reports, to. 
estimate future investment needs for .the. firm as a wholes. .However, .there was 
a systematic bias towards.overestimation of capacity in subsidiary reports, 
and the firm reached a point where it was short of actual capacity to meet 
consumer demand, even though on paper it was well able to meet this demand. 
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structures. The former type tend to be characterised by functional structures -
that is the constituent organisational parts of the firm are concerned with 
sales, production, financial control, etc. In the more diversified firms, 
the basic organisational units are divisional - that is, "they constitute 
product or geographical divisions, and within each of the divisions the functional 
operations are co-ordinated. (40.) 
The relevance of organisational control is that, given the need to 
balance the advantages of centralisation against the advantages of 
decentralisation, the particular organisational structure which is created in 
a complex, diversified firm will be that which best enables the head office to 
maintain control over the important areas of potential conflict in the 
operation of the technology. 
Control over the Financial Function 
There are three basic areas of control within the financial function 
of the firm. These are with regard to capital expenditure, recurrent 
expenditure and foreign exchange remittances. Since we have already discussed 
control over capital expenditure in an earlier section, we shall be primarily 
concerned here with the latter two. With regard to control over capital 
expenditure it is only necessary to add that the primary instrument for control 
over both capital and recurrent expenditure of a subsidiary is the budget. 
Particularly with regard to capital-spending, detailed guidelines are provided 
by the head office specifying the frequency-, type and level of detail with 
which the subsidiary's budgets have to be sent to head office for approval. 
Recurrent Expenditure: Once the important decisions with regard to 
accumulation"have already been made,"the
-
subsidiary"tends to have a fair ~ ' 
amount of latitude"with"regard
-
 to recurrent expenditure." The primary "control 
mechanism used here is"the performance of the firm,"which"may be-measured by 
a-number of criteria -such as~ profit on'salesy profit*on total assets-'and so 
on. The problem of-monitoring-this"i)erformance is compounded for"the firm-
by "the use of transfer"accounting'techniques "which""are designed to-mis-state 
the real value of flows. Many firms resolve this by the use of two (or more) 
sets of books: one for"internal use, one for the host-state, one for the 
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host-partner and so on. 
Foreign Exchange Remittances; This is one of the most prevalent and critical 
areas of conflict in the transfer of technology. We have already seen that 
because of the wide-spread existence of controls on the remission of foreign 
exchange and the likelihood of currency fluctuations, technology - suppliers 
have a strong interest in maintaining control over the repatriation of foreign 
exchange. Similarly, because of the frequent and critical foreign exchange 
gaps, host-states also have a strong interest in controlling the remission of 
this foreign exchange. 
The primary means of control for the host-state lies in the areas 
of policy formulation and specific agreements with the technology-supplier. 
For the technology-supplier the primary mechanism of control over foreign 
exchange remittances lies in transfer accounting, a factor which we shall 
now discuss in some detail. 
The relationship between technology-suppliers and subsidiaries, 
host-partners and host-state is characterised by a multifarious flow of 
goods and services from one party to another which is counterbalanced by 
a returning flow of payment.- In many cases the goods and services which 
are transferred in this set of relationships are readily available from a 
number of suppliers and have an easily obtained international price (e.g. 
dopper). Intra-firm -or intra-partner trade may thus be easily conducted 
at these 'arms-length' internationally-determined prices. But "... it 
is often extremely difficult... to estimate a true arms-length price for 
the type of goods moving between members of a multinational system. And 
in the case of royalties and management fees the problem may be 
insuperable." (33 p. ±85') "This "means that "an agreed price must be determined 
for the payment of these goods and services. The practice of using these 
'artificial' prices may be termed transfer accounting. 
24. Schulman found in his empirical investigation of transfer pricing 
that a number of the sample firms resorted to the use of alternative sets 
of company books. 
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This transfer accounting refers to both goods and services. In most 
cases it refers to the price - charged-for the intra-firm transfer of goods, 
but it also refers to charges against services such as interest, royalties, 
technical and management fees, overhead and administrative charges. 
The potential complexity of this transfer accounting process is 
staggering, Robbins and Stobaugh" illustrate this by pointing out that if 
there exist ten forms of interchange between each subsidiary in the firm, 
then a firm with two subsidiaries may have ten links, a firm with three 
subsidiaries thirty links and with 2.5 subsidiaries 3,000 intra-firm financial 
links.^ 
There thus exists considerable scope for the use of transfer 
accounting to remit profits in the transfer of technology, particular-ly when 
these transfers take place within the same corporation. There is no firm 
evidence of how wide-spread these practices really are, although we do know 
26 
that in a series of particular circumstances it does occur at a very 
significant level. In some of the literature there is the assertion that 
these practices are not widespread. Robbins and Stobaugh, for example, 
suggest that they are most likely to exist'in the case of 'medium sized' 
27 
firms, as the large firms "tend to establish uniform policies that involve 
standard mark-ups", (33, p° 91) and "The small company, relatively new in the 
international field, often is not in a position to worry much about 
intercompany pricing practices." (33, p» 92) Vernon refers to Vaitsos's well-
known work on Colombia by suggesting that it is probably atypical? "The data, 
therefore, may simply represent evidence of the fact that when-governments 
want to limit the level of profits taken by multinational corporations, they 
may succeed in affecting only the form in which the profits are taken and 
not their size'.' (46) Finally, Horngren, in- his basic accounting text book, 
suggests in the absence of arms length prices the use of a series of 
transfer prices, none of which seems to be based on the sorts of considerations 
suggested by Schulman (36), Chudnovsky (7), Murray (forthcoming), Vaitsos (44) 
or Girvan. (12) A set of text book prices, apportioning costs and rewards in 
relation to subsidiaries' contributions, is suggested by Horngren. 
25. One of the firms in their sample had 500 separate subsidiaries. 
26. Most notably, see Vaitsos (43), Murray, (forthcoming) and Chudnovsky 
(7). Chudnovsky estimates that if account Is taken of the use of transfer 
pricing, the effective profit of thirteen firms in Colombia rose from 16.4 
per cent (which was declared) to 44»4 per cent. 
27. That is with international sales over $100 million and less than 
$500 million. 
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A major constraining factor on the prevalence of these transfer 
accounting techniques is argued to be the policies of the governments of 
the technology-suppliers. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service "requires 
arms length prices - prices that would be charged to an unaffiliated 
party for all goods and services provided by parents to its subsidiaries 
and vice versa". But even in these cases, "as the technical know-how and 
management services provided by one unit of a multinational enterprise to 
another usually are unique items without a market value, there is no exact 
arms length price applicable•to such transaction". Because of these and 
other problems, "in practice...the enterprise has a certain amount of leeway 
in setting prices", (33,PP« 88-9) even vis-a-vis the developed country 
governments. It is likely, therefore, that in the case of the transfer 
of technology to underdeveloped countries the use of transfer accounting 
techniques may be an extremely widespread method of remitting foreign 
exchange earnings. This contention is borne out by the evidence of 
empirical studies cited above. It is important to list the reasons why the 
technology-supplier may be concerned to manipulate transfer accounting 
techniques in an attempt to repatriate foreign exchange. Briefly these are: 
(1) To obtain a larger share of profits from a joint venture; 
(2) To speed up the flow of funds in order to avoid the risk of currency 
fluctuations; 28 
(3) To ensure an appropriate flow of funds in the light of its needs to 
maximise the cash flow from a transfer at any particular point in 
time; 
29 
(4) To avoid or to.reduce the payment of taxes_and. tariffs; 
(5) To avoid restrictions on profits. aoid._remittances; 
(6) To maintain competitive advantages, such as when for many years oil 
companies maintained low profits on refining and distribution and high 
profits on extractions in order to avoid competition in these spheres; 
(36) 
This is probably the most important reason for transfer pricing 
nowadays, but is inadequately treated in much of the literature. For a 
comprehensive discussion of the problem see Robbins and Stobaugh (33) • 
29. "If Tg is the tariff rate of imports made by a firm from the parent, 
and t£ and t^ are the income tax rates in the host and home countries 
respectively, it will be convenient to use transfer pricing only if 
t
2
 - t.^" Chudnovsky, (7), p. 98. 
- 39 -
ids/dp 224 
(7) When there is a policy of a worldwide company price for 
the product, and high cost subsidiaries need to be 
compensated for adherence to this price; 
(8) In the interests of maintaining good public relations in the 
host-country; and 
(9) To avoid anti-trust legislation. 
The extent to which each of these factors will influence behaviour 
of course varies from case to case. From the empirical studies available we do 
have some evidence to suggest that it may be a widespread practice notwith-
standing the reservations of some, noted above. Of particular importance here 
is the observation that "where profits are small in relation to total intra-firm 
transfers, a transfer price which is only a small percentage above an arms] length 
price may lead to a much higher percentage increase in profits. It is estimated 
for Kenya, for example, that a 1 per cent rate of overpricing of inputs would 
lead to an increase of 105 per cent in profits, and a 10 per cent increase in 
input prices would raise profits by 288 per cent. 
Control over Staffing 
In the operation "of" transferred technology, the managerial function 
can be distinguished from the entrepreneurial and operational functions. The 
entrepreneurial function, as we have seen, concerns the allocation of investment 
for accumulation, broad strategic policies of the subsidiary and negotiation with 
the host-state. The operational function is predominantly an engineering one, 
where responsibility lies in ensuring that production and quality targets are 
met. The management function ensures the- running of the plant in accordance with 
the directions of the entrepreneurial functions, and is concerned with the year-
by-year operation of the plant. -It supervises"the purchase of inputs, the 
transformation of these inputs into final-product and the disposal of the final 
product, subject to the constraints of entrepreneurial decision-making and 
operational difficulties. 
The supplier of technology tends not to be very concerned with 
the recruitment of those who operate the plant. Indeed, because of the 
political pressure in favour of localisation in underdeveloped countries, and 
30. I.L.O., (22), p. 455. Logically a percentage increase in the price of 
final goods will have a greater effect on profits than the same percentage 
increase on any input. 
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because of the lower cost of local labour, the technology-supplier, host-partner 
and host-state have a common interest in localisation. However, with regard to 
the entrepreneurial and management functions, the technology-supplier has a 
strong interest in controlling these decisions as they are important areas for 
the exercise of control. This is done in two ways. Either the staffing lies 
in the hands of the technology-supplier, or, where local manpower is used, 
strenuous efforts are made to incorporate local staff members into the 'family' 
of the firm, so that their decisions will not be at variance with the interests 
of the firm as a whole. 
There is considerable evidence that-managerial and entrepreneurial 
functions are primarily staffed by home•country personnel or manpower from 
other developed countries. For example, " a survey /"of U.S. multi-national 
corporations/ conducted turned up nineteen foreigners in the group, of whom 
fourteen were Canadian or British". (45) Girvan, in his survey of the bauxite 
industry also finds strong evidence to suggest that the technology-suppliers 
try to keep the right to reserve a significant number of managerial positions 
for expatriates. (14) 
Where local managerial manpower is recruited, attempts are made to 
integrate this staff into the management ethos of the technology-supplier. 
One of the ways in which this is done is consciously to attempt to replicate the 
life-style and interests of the departing expatriates by paying salaries equal 
to or greater than those of departing expatriates. (22, 25, 15) 
Another way is to organise an interchange of manpower between various 
international subsidiaries to induce a corporate perspective and responsibility. 
The result of these pressures is that when a conflict of interests emerges 
between the technology-supplier and the host-state, the locally recruited 
managerial staff see their
1
 primary responsibility as lying with the 
technology=supplier and not the host-state. 
Conti'ol over the Inventive Function 
The process of invention is crucial to continued accumulation. 
Since control over accumulation is of primary interest to the technology-
supplier, it is logical that organised inventive activities are closely 
controlled by it. There are two ways in which this is done. Firstly, major 
research is performed in the home country, and secondly, where invention does 
arise from operations in another country, ownership of and control over this 
technical change is held by the head office. 
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Research in the underdeveloped country subsidiary is primarily 
of the trouble shooting variety. More fundamental research into new types 
of product and process or cost reducing techniques is generally confined 
to the developed countries and to the home country in particular.^
1
 The 
subsidiaries stand as recipients of technical change: subsidiaries of the 
Metal Box Company, for example, receive a monthly list of technical develop-
ment from the head office. These technical developments are the results of 
research done in the U.K. research centre as well as those communicated from 
other subsidiaries. All proprietary rights over technical change occuring in 
any subsidiary are vested with the head office and are therefore under its 
control. This is a common~system"and helps to explain the technological 
dependence of underdeveloped countries. 
INSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL 
There are a wide range of instruments which the head office of the 
technology-supplier is able to use to enforce its power at the subsidiary 
level. Some of these controls are formally specified, and other operate at 
the non-formalised level. Vernon sums up the position with regard to wholly-
owned subsidiaries effectively: 
When a parent ejects to control, its subsidiary effectively, 
formal restrictions are redundant;, where they exist., the . 
motivation_is partly, .or wholly.to ensure .against the._poss_ibility_ 
that.the parent may one. day lose._control._of _the subsidiary, through 
expropriation or otherwise. As long as control is secure, however, 
a rational parent will not hesitate to use the wholly-owned 
subsidiary for any purpose - consistent or not consistent with the 
restrictions - provided that the use contributes to the strategy of 
the system as a whole. (46) 
The position vis-a-vis joint ventures or management contracts is 
different in the sense that controls have to be more carefully specified, 
due to the greater likelihood-of conflict with the host-partner or host-state. 
In this case, it is in the interest of the technology-supplier to freeze the 
initial balance of power to avoid the risk of decreasing relative dominance 
over time. In these circumstances it is more usual to find that the 
instruments of control are carefully specified in the agreement, and a 
lesser reliance by the technology - supplier on 'informal' control 
instruments. 
31. There is however an alternative view on this issue which suggests 
that as a result of trouble..shooting, research, ^ subsidiaries, in underdeveloped 
countries obtain the same sort of technical progress which results from more 
formalised research programmes at the head office. J.M. Katz, (23). 
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We shall be looking at four types of formalised, instruments of 
control in the transfer of technology, aware though that in wholly-owned 
subsidiaries, control may be exercised without necessarily being formalised. 
The first of these instruments is the use of specific contracts, such as 
management, sales and purchase contracts,. The second instrument is the 
memorandum and articles of association of the joint venture, and the third 
instrument is the use of restrictive clauses,, The fourth instrument concerns 
the legal status of the agreement,- In the case of the first two instruments, 
the discussion will take the form of an examination of a joint-venture 
agreement in Zambia between the host-state and the Anglo-American 
Corporation. 
Agreed Contracts 
Management, purchasing and marketing contracts vary in their scope 
with the technical knowledge and managerial capability of the host-partner 
and the host-state. We shall"be examining a representative set of management) 
purchasing and marketing agreements agreed between the Government of Zambia 
and the Anglo - American Corporation, following the partial (51 per cent) 
nationalisation of Anglo's copper operations in Zambia in 1969® 
The Management Contract; (48) "The general duty of the management in this 
exclusive contract was "towards the general management of the Company's 
business and specifically directed towards the optimisation by the Company 
of the production and profit". No specification was made if there should 
32 
prove to be a conflict between output and profit in the operation of the 
mines. The Company had the right to appoint the Managing Director. As part 
of the agreement Anglo was to provide technical services which inter-alia 
include "capital expenditure estimates"; short and long term plans, viability 
studies and the like for maintaining, expanding or improving operations and 
production; advice on "operating problems" and "the scheduling-of
-
"copper 
production"; advise on "research and development"; and advice on and 
procurement of technical change. 
32. Easily envisaged in the extraction of variable grade ones. 
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Anglo had also to-provide general and advisory services which 
required advice inter-alia, on production and marketing; preparation of 
financial statements, reports and accounts; computer and management 
services; and labour relations. Anglo was also to keep the joint venture 
"promptly informed of significant developments relating to the mining and 
production of copper" and cobalt throughout the world of which Anglo is from 
time to time aware and to the extent to which such information is available 
for release". 
"Anglo shall provide~or procure the-provision of senior staff as 
may be required from time to time by the Company". Any invention and know-how 
resulting from the activities of this staff would be available to the joint 
venture "PROVIDED ALWAYS that the Company ..-
1
, shall cooperate with Anglo ... 
in procuring the registration"(for Anglo) ... as licensee of all such 
Invention Rights ^ emphasis in original}". 
A number of things emerge from this agreement which reflected and 
reinforced Anglo's dominant power in the joint venture. Firstly Anglo 
controlled the flow of information to-the host-state with regard to 
production, financial flows and•technical change. Secondly, Anglo controlled 
the appointment of senior staff, and thirdly, Anglo obtained the proprietary 
rights over technical change. "In" the light-of the earlier discussion of areas 
of control, Anglo was obviously in a strong position, particularly when the 
management contract is read in association with the articles of association 
which provide Anglo with control over capital investment. 
The Purchasing Contract: (49) In this exclusive agreement Anglo undertook 
"to negotiate and conclude all arrangements for the supply and delivery of 
all goods required by the Company and its subsidiaries at the best prices 
that can be obtained", as well as to arrange transport, insurance and 
clearing facilities. While this agreement gave Anglo considerable scope 
for transfer pricing if it so desired, there was an additional clause which 
allowed Anglo to increase the commission costs if the agreement appeared to 
result in an "overall financial loss to Anglo"! In the light of the evidence 
which exists on the use of transfer prices in similar circumstances in other 
parts of the world, it is clear that control over the financial operations 
of the joint venture was firmly held by Anglo. 
kh -
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Marketing Agreement-; The marketing agreement "appoints Anglo as its 
exclusive agent in each and every country throughout the world .»
0
 for 
finding purchasers for all ores, metals, or minerals, or any by products .0. 
produced by the Company and all its subsidiaries". The Agreement also: 
allowed for the exclusive purchase of this copper by it or any of Anglo's 
subsidiaries. 
In this agreement Anglo controlled the disposal of the output, 
particularly insofar as it disallowed access to the product by any of its 
rivals. One of the more important areas of control - that is monopolistic 
control over the disposal of a source of raw materials - was thus maintained 
by Anglo. 
The Memorandum and Articles of Association -
In this nationalisation the Master Agreement, referred to as the 
"Heads of Agreement" (47), and"the "Memorandum and Articles of Association 
cover much of the same ground, We will therefore confine ourselves to a 
discussion of the Heads of Agreement (which summarises the other two 
agreements) in an attempt to show how this agreement, read in conjunction 
with the contracts discussed above, enabled Anglo-American to exert control 
over the important decisions in the operation of the technology to mine 
and refine copper In Zambia,. 
With regard to the payment stream, the host-state agreed that as 
long as the twelve-year bonds were outstanding, the mining operations 
would not be subject to additional "numerous taxes, export taxes, income 
taxes, royalty payments, withholding-taxes or any other revenue measure". 
No import duties on mining equipment, machinery and supplies above the 
"average" rate would be levied. No tax would be paid on dividends to any 
shareholders, as long as the bonds were outstanding. Finally, dividends 
were remittable free of exchange control at I.M.F. parity rates, Through 
these sets of arrangements, Anglo was able to control any adverse change 
in the payment stream and- ensure the""free repatriation of"" earnings. -"Thus 
two-of the major areas~of conflict"mentioned above had effectively been 
frozen, and future control-albeit-for the period of time for which the 
bonds were outstanding - remained with Anglo. 
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Affirmative votes of a majority of the five Anglo directors (out 
of eleven) were required on a number of actions of the joint-ventures, 
thereby giving an effective veto to Anglo on any of these issues. These 
included: 
(1) "Any disposal of all or of any substantial part of the assets" -
this enabled Anglo to ensure that rival firms did not gain access 
to the fruits of the operation. 
(2) Diversification into any-"substantially different* activities -
this enabled Anglo to maintain partial control over the use of 
the surplus. 
(3) "Any new mining" operation-or facility""or" the expansion of an" existing 
mining operation"or facility" whichnwas ~not commercially viable as 
judged by Anglo directors, or the ability to raise such funds on 
"commercially competitive terms" - this effectively enabled Anglo 
to control any attempt by the host—state to generate external 
economies. 
(4) "Appropriations in respect of capital expenditure or expenditure for 
exploration or prospecting" other than for operations agreed to by 
Anglo directors. 
(5) "Any act, dealing, arrangement or transaction which, in the opinion 
of a majority of the "B" Directors, is not directed towards and/or 
calculated to attain the optimisation-of production and profit"-this 
clause allowed Anglo to control the host-state in its attempts to 
pursue its own broader strategic interests. 
This Memorandum and Articles of Association, together with the 
managerial, purchasing and marketing contracts discussed earlier can be 
related to the earlier discussion of the five areas of control. Control 
over entrepreneurial decisions was effectively wielded through the veto of 
the Anglo directors on diversification, expansion of production, etc.," as 
well as by the nature of the information which was passed on to the joint 
- 46 -
ids /dp 224 
venture in the management contract. At the same time, the marketing 
contract and the directorial veto enabled Anglo to control the supply 
of copper to potential competitors, thereby exercising some tenuous 
control over accumulation by rivals in processing and mining facilities. 
Control over the organisational structure of the firm, while not 
a particularly important - area in a joint venture of this type, was once 
again maintained by Anglo, partly through the veto of their directors, 
but largely through the management contract which gave Anglo exclusive 
rights to gather and present operational data to the joint venture. 
The important area of financial control rested firmly with Anglo. 
The payment stream was stabilised? recurrent (and capital) expenditure 
was limited to "commercially viable" activities not "substantially 
different" from present operations without Anglo directors' approval; 
and remittances of foreign exchange were-guaranteed. 
The staffing of senior positions was controlled by Anglo through 
the management contract, and some control over the attitudes of senior 
Zambian personnel was assured by an agreed programme of training in other 
worldwide subsidiaries of the Anglo - American Corporation. 
Finally control over the inventive function was maintained in a 
number of ways. The management contract gave Anglo the exclusive right to 
provide technical and engineering services, and provision was also made 
for the acquisition by Anglo of property rights over the "Invention Rights" 
which may have resulted from research and development. 
Anglo thus managed to obtain comprehensive control over the operation 
of the technology, notwithstanding the-acquisition by the host-state of the 
majority of the equity. This control followed largely from the lack of 
manpower and know-how of the host-state. (5, 11) The expectation that the 
relative power of the host-state over these processes (which are"vital
-
for ' 
control over accumulation) would -increase over time, led Anglo to~attempt to 
freeze the balance of control for the twelve - year period for which the 
bonds were outstanding. 
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The preponderance of Anglo control was, however, recognised by 
the host - state and led the President to declare three and a half years 
later that the payment of the bonds would be speeded up, thereby freeing 
the host-state from some of this control. "The effective control of the 
industry", he-declared, "was vested firmly in the minority shareholders".(24) 
In particular, he continued, this control had enabled Anglo American (and R.S.T.) 
to obtain financial advantages over the use of foreign exchange and the restriction 
of taxes. The use of profits had been confined to mining activities, and 
even this accumulation had to be funded through borrowing, as the firms 
controlled the use of profits and ensured that these were paid out as 
dividends, rather than being reinvested. Finally, the management and 
purchasing contracts had led to the purchase of inputs from "non-resident 
companies for reasons best known to themselves, but not comprehensible to 
US"E 
As a result, three actions were taken-in an attempt to switch 
control to the host-state. Firstly, the bonds were to be redeemed 
33 immediately, secondly, the three contracts were to be revoked by giving 
01 
the required two years notice and thirdly, the" two"firms were to be 
subject to normal tax provisions and exchange control regulations. Recently, 
33. This was made possible by the unexpectedly high price of copper on the 
world market. Presumably Anglo and R.S.T., when the agreements were reached, 
had not anticipated these high prices and had banked on the hope that a 
shortage of foreign exchange would preclude such a step by the host-state. 
34. This meant that in all Anglo was able to maintain these agreements 
for a total of almost six years, half of the period of the anticipated 
twelve years. 
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 purchasing and sales contracts have also been terminatedo35 
If all of the expressed aims are satisfied, a significant degree of control 
will have passed to the host-stateo But this would imply a changed relative 
power over the ability to control accumulation and the operation of the plant, 
and there is as yet no unambiguous evidence that the host-state has a 
significantly greater' degree of control over either of these. It- will be 
interesting to see whether the President's statement expressed a fundamentally 
changed balance of power or rather (as is suspected) the perception of the 
real control of the host-state with respect to the two companies
0 
Restrictive Clauses (See 34°) 
A wide variety of restrictive clauses can be used by the technology-
supplier® As many underdeveloped countries have moved from import substitution 
to export promotion policies, attention has been focussed on clauses restricting 
the scale or area of exportso The Andean Pact Studies showed that of a total 
number of 247 contracts in Bolivia, Colombia^ Ecuador and Peru, 200 had a 
total prohibition on exports and a-further 12 permitted exports only to 
certain areas. Only 35 allowed f^ee exports of outputo (41) 
35° The expected results of these actions with respect to the takeover 
of activities were summarised by the Chairman of the Company in the 1974 
Financial Statement as followss 
Consequently, Exchange Control regulations now, apply.to.the. remittance 
of dividends to .the .external shareholders of RCM and our Company,, In 
addition, the ordinary dividends
>
became
9
 upon payment, subject to 
deduction of withholding ..tax which is currently at the rate of 20 per 
cent. The redemption of the outstanding Zimeo bonds and loan stocks 
also made it possible for the tax legislation in terms of which the 
mining companies received.100. per cent allowances for capital 
expenditure to be withdrawn at the end of September 1973° Government 
is in the process of formulating new tax legislation to replace that 
which was withdrawn last yeai°
0
 Pending the enactment of such 
legislation, the charge for taxation has, with effect from 1st October 
1973s been calculated on the basis of the result that Nchanga stands 
to pay this year- an additional Kl6 million over and above what would 
have been payable had the 100 percent capital allowances been in force. 
In addition, the Zambian Government (as_.
8
A'..shareholders) .are responsible 
for the appointment .of the Managing Director. .These, .claims, should, however 
be accepted with reservations The Financial Times of August.7«. 1974 
suggests,, for ..example, that the new marketing .arrangements, may make.it 
difficult to maintain the exis ting., skill e_d_ expatriate .marketing staff in 
Europe. In addition, we have already considered some of the mechanisms 
whereby technology-suppliers can circumvent government policies. 
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But there are other widely used restrictive clauses. Vaitsos, in 
the study mentioned earlier (43), showed how clauses restricting the source 
of inputs were used to transfer price profits from Colombia. Reference to 
other literature on restrictive clauses, and to our discussion of the fifteen 
areas of conflict in an earlier section, will show that restrictive clauses 
are widely used, particularly in joint-ventures, in an attempt to exercise 
control in each of these areas. Thus we have evidence, for example, of 
restrictive clauses on patents, prices, production of similar products, 
secrecy, quality, volume of sales, hiring of personnel, etc. One particularly 
interesting clause emerges from Spain.' It-stipulated that if technical change 
were to emerge from the subsidiary's operations in Spain, the property rights 
over this technical change were to be held by the head office and the Spanish 
subsidiary would have to pay royalties to the head office for the use of the 
technology which it had itself developed! 
The Legal Status of the Agreement 
We have seen from our"earlier discussion that two central concerns of 
the technology-supplier are to curtail"the degree of risk involved in the 
transfer and to freeze the balance of power at the date of agreement if it 
is thought that a dominant position may be eroded over time. 
Both these objectives may be furthered within the framework of the 
legal status of the agreement. The control mechanism, here, is to 'freeze 
the environment' at the date of agreement and to build into this agreement 
heavy costs if the agreement is broken. In the case of the Anglo-American 
agreement with the Government of Zambia which we have discussed at length, 
a clause was inserted which froze the legal environment at the date on which 
the agreement was signed. That is, in the case of a recourse, to arbitration: 
...all disputes...shall be determined by_the_ law of.Zambia,(including 
its rules, on the conflict of laws) .as in force,.on. the. date of execution of 
these Heads..of.Agreement disregarding all legislation,.instruments, 
orders, direction and court decisions .having the. force of law in. 
Zambia {.other than those contemplated by these Heads of Agreements) 
adopted, made, issued or given subsequent to the date of execution of 
these Heads of Agreement. 
A similar clause appears in the Zambia Government's agreement with 
R.S.T., where in the case of disputes, the law of Zambia as of December 24, 
1969, "disregarding all subsequent legislation, decisions, instruments, 
orders and directions having the force of law of Zambia will be applied". (32) 
Similarly in the agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the 
Sierra Leone Selection Trust Ltd., all disputes will be determined "in 
36. Which is part of the R.S.T. family. 
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accordance with the law of Sierra Leone (including its rules on the 
conflict of laws) as in force on 31st March 1970. ..notwithstanding that 
such legislation instruments, orders, directives or Courts decisions are 
stated or intended to come into effect retrospectively".(38) 
This rather extraordinary clause has the effect of removing the 
sovereignty of the host-state with respect to the operation of the 
technology. It is extraordinary not so much because it is unusual, but 
because it is a loss of "sovereignty which the respective host-states 
would not easily yield to "the governments of powerful developed countries: 
yet they seem to countenance the loss of sovereignty to a private firm. 
Having frozen the environment, the object of the technology-
supplier is then to impose heavy costs on the host-state or partner if 
it wishes to break these agreements. In all three cases which we have 
looked at above, the arbitrating body-is to be an arm of the World Bank. 
Thus, in the Anglo-American "agreement, the host-state agreed to ratify 
"The Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States 
and Nationals of Other States ... of the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes of the World Bank (ICSID)". 
The point of referring disputes to ICSID (or an equivalent body) 
is that insofar as ICSID is an arm of the-World Bank, failure to agree 
to its arbitration may well lead "to sanctions by the World Bank itself, 
and insofar* as the Bank'is a-powerful" body in the disbursement of aid, 
this sanction would impose great costs on-an underdeveloped country. 
HOST STATE POLICIES AS A CHANNEL FOR CONTROL 
In "theory, it "is possible""for
 _
a"~host-state to introduce a wide • 
range of policies, ranging from detailed control over most aspects 
concerned in the transfer and operation-of technology to a laissez faire 
approach which allows the supplier and recipient of technology almost 
complete freedom of action. In reality, of course, the efficacy of 
any policy which the host-state may wish to enact is dependent upon the 
power of the state with respect to the technology-supplier and local 
partner. 
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We shall examine these state policies in three broad areas, 
resource accessibility, operational conditions and the payment stream. 
But this is not to argue that these are the only spheres in which the 
host-state is able to exert control. There are other more general 
policies such as those concerning foreign-investment and industrialisation 
which are relevant to "the problem of~c'ontrol and which are mentioned in 
a more general context than the three types of policy discussed below. 
Resource Accessibility ~ 
The type of policies concerning-resource accessibility will 
obviously be affected by the nature of the operation in question. In 
the manufacturing and service sectors, the primary local resource is 
likely to be that of labour. In most cases, the host-state is able 
to control the access to this labour, and since it is cheap labour' which 
frequently attracts the technology-supplier to an underdeveloped country, 
the host-state is placed in the position of ensuring an adequate supply 
of cheap labour to the technology-supplier. In the extreme eases of 
export processing zones (e.g. South Korea and Taiwan), legislation which 
protects the rights of labour to organise is specifically waived in order 
to attract foreign investors. 
The role of the host-state with-respect to resource accessibility 
is more important and far-ranging in the case of mineral production than 
in the processing of minerals and agricultural products or in the 
manufacturing or services sectors. Here the local resource is not 
primarily labour. Accessibility to this natural resource has a number 
of features. These are:-
(l) The extent of•availability: exploration, mining and buying 
rights have to be defined over a certain volume or area of the resource. 
Frequently the host-state provides rights-over an unnecessarily large 
area, which might suit the company which is concerned to limit 
potential competition. In this case much of the area or volume governed 
by the agreement may remain untouched. For example, in the case of Zambian 
copper, one company had previously held unutilised exploration and 
production rights over 4»000 square miles of land south of the Copperbelt 
for sixteen-years.- The-reaction of the Zambian"Government" in this case" was 
to stipulate minimum expenditure requirements as part of the exploration 
agreement. (l6) 
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(2) The type of resource: in some cases there may be external economies 
in exploration, buying or mining which will pay the operator to combine 
his activities over a number of different products. The agreement on 
resource use may cover all feasible products, or there may exist a 
separate agreement for each separate case. The extent to which the 
host-state is able to specify the agreement to narrow down the number 
of products of each agreement will tend to reflect, its power vis-a-vis 
that of the technology—supplier. 
(3) The duration of the agreement will vary from case to case. In the 
case of bauxite exploration
-
in"the Caribbean, Girvan found that agreements 
tended to vary between 25 and 75 years i" (14) Significantly, the latter 
figure resulted from an agreement in-Haiti which is exactly what we would 
37 
expect from a country with little bar-gaining power. In the case of 
copper in Zambia, renegotiation of the agreement in 1969 resulted in a 
limit of 25 years, compared to the earlier agreement which gave rights in 
perpetuity. 
Operational Conditions 
The operation of"the transferred technology entails the 
transformation of domestic and foreign inputs into outputs, some of which 
may be disposed of locally and some of which may be exported. The host-
state may be able to set boundaries on the availability of the inputs and 
the disposal of outputs in -a number of ways. 
Availability of Inputss Control"over natural resources has been discussed 
earlier and we are primarily concerned here with the availability of factors 
38 
of production and intermediate inputs. The state may control the inflow 
of imported inputs through the use of tariffs, or it may use non-tariff 
barriers, such as quantitative restrictions on imports. 
A switch from foreign to domestic inputs may be encouraged not 
only by the trade barriers, but also by a complementary programme of 
local-content incentives. Countries such as Brazil and South Africa, for 
example, have been able to speed up import substitution by instituting 
37. Or willpower, either. 
38. Labour* has been discussed above as a basic resource. 
- 53 -
ids/dp 224 
incentives for increasing the'share of local inputs. 
Access to local inputs can be used by the host-state as an 
important bargaining point enabling it to achieve a particular type of 
control. In Kenya, for example, access to local credit is being used in 
an attempt to increase local "equity ownership. "Foreign companies will now 
be able to raise their overdraft at local banks in proportion to the number 
of shares they offer on the local market," (Financial Times, November 1, 1973) 
In South Africa, local ownership"has been successfully raised in at least one 
case by a set of host-state policies. Thus, Alcan Aluminium reduced its 
holdings in its South African subsidiary from 60 per cent to 24 per cent. 
Alcan_.said the.proposed increase in. South African..ownership 
would permit Alcan So.uth .Africa to borrow locally without, 
restriction, and relieve Alcan Aluminium of responsibility to 
finance expansion, except as it might agree to do so. Alcan 
also said the reduction of its share of the company will 
reflect a change in business relationship in recent years 
whereby tariffs and government policies have forced Alcan South 
Africa to buy its ingot from a domestic South African smelter 
rather than importing aluminium from Canada. (Financial Times, 
November 6, 1973), 
While we have no idea to what extent Alcan may-still be-able to exert 
control over the South African subsidiary, there is a strong suggestion in 
this report that host-state policies were^increasingly limiting this sphere 
of control. This case would represent an unusually strong bargaining power 
of a host-state, and mirrors the viewpoint that South Africa can not easily 
be considered an underdeveloped country. 
One of the stronger weapons in the armoury of government policy 
is reputed to be the control over the use. of foreign exchange. Policies 
on the repatriation of profits or capital assets and the extensive use of 
permits to ration foreign exchange are potentially valuable elements of 
control. The problem, as we have seen, with these policies lies in the 
ability of the technology - suppliers to reduce their efficacy by evasion. 
The extent to which they are able to evade these policies is a reflection of the 
relative powers of the host-state - and the technology-supplier,although it 
must be recognised that"this power of evasion is one of the determining 
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characteristics of the multi-national corporation. Governments of developed 
countries or those of particularly 'powerful' host-states, such as Japan, 
do not have complete control over the evasion of these sorts of restrictions. 
One final element of government policy over operational conditions 
which has particular relevance—to many underdeveloped countries concerns 
control over employment. There are two types of basic employment policies 
here. The first is to increase the share of local employees and to decrease 
the share of expatriates. At the-non-managerial and non-executive level, 
underdeveloped countries
-
have been quite successful in achieving this end. 
Thus the Venezuelan subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey raised the 
share of local staff from 48" per cent in 1959 to 68 per cent in 1964, and 
Aramco in Saudi Arabia raised the share of local supervisory staff from 
almost zero in the late 1940s to 56 per cent in 1967° (46) 
The second type of policy is aimed at the creation of new jobs 
in an attempt to decrease the extent of urban unemployment. One example 
of this type of policy"is"the Tripartite Agreement"between trade "unions, 
employers and government in Kenya which aimed at an all-round increase in 
formal sector employment of 10 per cent. (22) 
Disposal of Output; The most general form which this policy takes is 
an attempt to increase the share of exports-in total output. There are 
a variety of mechanisms which the host-state can use. Where the state 
has firm control over the establishment of industries (such as the Indian 
system of industrial licences), the transfer can be formally tied to 
specified levels and shares of output. This may be supplemented or even 
substituted by the use of inducements (such as tax concessions) for 
increased exports. But as we have already seen in our discussion of the 
international context of transfer, control over the direction of output 
is one of the major concerns of the technology-suppliers: even the most 
attractive inducements, and in some cases the most carefully specified 
agreed levels of exports, may be ignored if'they conflict with the more 
fundamental interests of the technology-suppliers. 
The Payment Stream 
Control over the payment stream reflects the ability of the 
host-state to affect the distribution of the surplus which arises from 
control over accumulation. The host-state frequently has two roles in 
which it can attempt to influence the payment stream - qua partner, 
when it holds equity in a joint-venture with the technology-supplier, and 
qua state, when it attempts to exercise power through government policy. 
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There is a battery of policies which the state can use in 
attempting to control the disposition of surplus. Most of them centre 
around taxation of one form or anothers taxes on profits, salep, 
production, imports, exports and so on. There are however a number of 
channels which the technology-supplier may use to repatriate effective 
profits (such as royalties, management fees, etc.), so there is 
considerable scope for the technology-supplier to evade these attempts 
at controlling the payment stream.- The extent to which the host-state 
perceives the transfer accounting practices of the technology-supplier 
is one factor in the exercise of control, but it is by no means a 
sufficient factor. 
One difficulty in discussing host-state imposed parameters on 
behaviour in this general way, is that it tells us little of the nature 
of control which may arise in any -particular" context. Potentially, all 
of the policies discussed-above can-"be"introduced by any host-state. In 
fact, most of them are not,- and where they are they may be of little 
effect. This is the conclusion reached by Stopford and Wells: "Some 
countries, bargaining from certain elements of strength, are in a far 
better position than others to"impose their desires. The policies, 
therefore, are one thing; the outcome of the policies quite another." 
(40, p. 151) 
C O N C L U S I O N 
Control in the transfer^of technology can only be understood in 
relation to conflict and as a means to settling conflict in the interests 
of the dominant party. As such the substance and exercise of this 
control should be distinguished from its formal appearance (e.g. equity 
shares). 
Although the exercise of control can be learned as in the case of 
the use of more sophisticated bargaining strategies - it more importantly 
reflects the underlying power of the respective parties. This power 
ultimately stems from the ability to mobilise the technical and 
financial resources necessary for capital accumulation. 
This ability to accumulate is not only a reflection of the nature 
and spread of technology and financial resources, but more importantly it 
reflects the nature of the class structure within the accumulating system. 
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In the transfer of technology the dominant class is invariably the 
technology-supplier, generally part of a large multinational 
corporation,, The behaviour of this class reflects accumulation in the 
world system, and the behaviour and interests of the technology-supplier 
in any particular transfer can only really be understood in terms of 
accumulation in the world system. 
In the recipient "underdeveloped countries two groups are involved 
in the transaction, the host-partner"and the host-state. Generally the 
host-partner sees a closer identity of interests with the technology-
supplier than the host-state and the latter is therefore more often in 
conflict with the technology-supplier. 
Whilst recognising that the host-state seldom reflects a 
homogeneous set of class interests and that it is also seldom in 
fundamental conflict with the technology-supplier, some consideration 
has been paid to the areas in'which its attention should be focussed and 
how it may begin to exercise control. 
More detailed attention has, however, been paid to the manner in 
which control may be exercised in the operation of the technology. Five 
areas of control have been specified - entrepreneurial, organisational, 
financial, staffing and invention - and the discussion has centred on 
how control may be exercised within these areas in the operation of the 
technology. 
From this discussion it has been argued that a distinction must 
be drawn between the substance and appearane-e of control. Thus while 
equity may reflect power it is seldom the source of power. Power, it 
has been argued, must ultimately be seen-in relation to the ability to 
accumulate and this accumulatory ability is-largely related to technological 
capability. So without an understanding of the nature of technological 
dominance, power, cannot be clearly specified and the substance of control 
is more likely to be confused by the appearance. 
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